The Consumer Response to Privacy Provisions in Gramm-Leach-Bliley: Much Ado about Nothing by Poggemiller, Eric
NORTH CAROLINA
BANKING INSTITUTE
Volume 6 | Issue 1 Article 22
2002
The Consumer Response to Privacy Provisions in
Gramm-Leach-Bliley: Much Ado about Nothing
Eric Poggemiller
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Banking Institute by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Eric Poggemiller, The Consumer Response to Privacy Provisions in Gramm-Leach-Bliley: Much Ado about Nothing, 6 N.C. Banking Inst.
617 (2002).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi/vol6/iss1/22
The Consumer Response to IPrivacy Provisions in Gramm-Leach-
Bliey: Much Ado About Nothing?
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent surveys have indicated that financial privacy is a
significant concern for the American consumer.! In response to
this concern, federal legislators added a financial privacy provision
(Title V) to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (GLBA). One
commentator referred to these privacy measures as "the most
sweeping privacy regulations ever passed."" However, tepid
consumer reaction4 and fierce criticism of the ways in which the
privacy notices were drafted and sent' indicate that GLBA is not
likely to be the last word on the regulation of consumer financial
privacy.'
This Note examines the responses of financial institutions
and consumers to the implementation of Title V (the privacy
provision) of GLBA, as well as the explanations for these
responses and the debates surrounding these explanations.
Because it is essential to understanding the context in which this
debate has formed, this Note first discusses the climate in which
1. Tom Woodruff, Protecting your privacy, available at http:1,,,.rntvnbZ.
com/newsl605555.asp (on file -with the North Carolina Banking Institute). But sce JI
HARPER & SOLVEIG SINGLETON, WITH A GRAIN OF SxLr: WHAT CONrSUIEF.
PRIVAcY SURVEYS DON'T TELL Us. introductory page (June 2001). available at
http:llv, Ti .cei.org/PDFsIvth.iarain_ofsLalt.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2002).
2. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1333-1431
(1999); 15 U.S.C. §§ 601-27 (2000).
3. Ronald A. Wirtz, Financial Evolution, Not Revolution, THE REGION
(quoting Robert Vagley, president of the American Insurance Association), at
http:/minneapolisfed.orgtpubfregio00-03i'fin-elolution.html (last %isited Feb. 3,
2002).
4. See Woodruff, supra note 1.
5. See, e.g., Tena Frier. & Beth Givens, Financial Privacy Notices: Do They
Really Want You to Knoow What They're Saying?, at http:liv,.-w.privacyrights.orgart
GLB-CodeOpEd.htm (last visited Feb. 23,2012).
6. See, e.g., Financial Information Privacy Protection Act of 201)1, S. 30, 107th
Cong. (2001), available at http:Ulthomas.loe.govbil sdl'7query.html (last% isited Feb.
23, 2002); Financial Information Privacy Act of 2102, 200l1 Cal. Lcgis. S.rv. 773
(West).
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GLBA was formed, including the debates regarding the shape
Title V would take, as well as pending legislation to amend
GLBA.7 Next, the Note details the actions financial institutions
took to comply with Title V, as well as the difficulties in achieving
that compliance.8 The next section discusses consumer reaction to
the implementation of Title V and contrasts the reaction with
some of the prevailing assumptions about consumers' privacy
concerns.9 Finally, this Note will examine some of the suggested
explanations for this reaction."0
IL OVERVIEW OF GLBA PRIVACY PROVISION
Title V of GLBA was formed in the shadow of a public
outcry over a high-profile case involving the dissemination of non-
public information by banks to third parties." Hatch v. U.S. Bank
(Nat'l Ass'n)'2 involved U.S. Bank's sale of consumer data to
telemarketers. 13 When those telemarketers solicited and sold
credit cards to consumers, the telemarketers automatically charged
the customers' fees to their bank or credit card accounts without
their permission, which the telemarketers were able to do because
they already had access to the account numbers through U.S.
Bank.14  Although this case eventually settled out of court, 5 it
prompted federal legislators into action. 6
7. See infra notes 11-59 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 60-84 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 96-164 and accompanying text.
11. See Robert H. Ledig, Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act Financial Privacy Provisions:
The Federal Government Imposes Broad Requirements to Address Consumer Privacy
Concerns, at http://www.fflisj.com/bancmail/bmarts/ecdp-art.htm (last visited Feb. 23,
2002).
12. No. 99-872 adm/ajb (D. Minn. 1999).
13. Thomas B. Smith, Comment: Programs Needed to Comply with Privacy Law,
AM. BANKER, Aug. 13, 1999, at 8.
14. Id. The bank was being sued because it had allegedly promised customers
that their private information would be kept confidential. The complaint also alleged
that U.S. Bank used information obtained from credit bureaus, a purpose not
authorized by the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA). Due to these complaints,
Minnesota claimed that U.S. Bank had "violated state consumer fraud, deceptive
trade, and false advertising statutes." Id. Another high-profile case that received
public attention was Ades v. Chase Manhattan Bank USA, No. 6003432000 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct., Manhattan filed Jan. 27, 2000). Settled out of court, this case involved Chase
Manhattan's sale of consumer personal financial information to non-affiliated
companies that would use the information to market non-financial products to the
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This action was taken through a privacy provision attached
to GLBA,17 an act designed to allow banks, investment banks, and
insurance companies to organize under one umbrella
organization. 8 The privacy provision quickly became the most
controversial aspect of the act.19 In particular, debate centered
upon two issues: first, whether to mandate an opt-in or an opt-out
regulatory scheme and second, whether to allow the dissemination
of nonpublic information to the institutions' affiliates."
The debate over the opt-inlopt-out provision involved
whether to forbid companies from disbursing nonpublic
information unless the consumer affirmatively gave permission for
the company to do so (opt-in) or whether to allow companies to
use the information unless the consumer expressly forbade the
company from doing so (opt-out).21 The supporters of an opt-in
provision did not want to force consumers to search through
difficult fine print in order to protect their privacy.2  While the
potentially high cost of an opt-in requirement concerned many
lawmakers.' Beth Givens of the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse
contends today that it may not cost financial institutions any more
customers. See Lisa Fickenscher, Chase Pact in IM Y Shows How States Could Set
Privacy Rules, AM. BANKER, Jan. 27, 2000, at 1. The terms of the settlement required
Chase to "sharply limit the sale of information on customers apprioving such use to
names, addresses, and telephone numbers." Id.
15. See Smith, supra note 13, at S. U.S. Bank paid approximately three million
dollars to the state as well as to certain charities. They also agreed to provide the
customers vith refunds for the amounts they had been charged for the telemarketer's
"products and services [the customers] did not vant or use." Id.
16. See Financial Services Modernization (Gramm-Leach-Bliley) Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 6S01-6827 (2000).
17. Id.
18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-627 (2000).
19. Ledig, supra note 11.
20. See 145 CONG. REc. H11538 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1944) (statement of Rep.
Davis); 145 CONG. REC. S13894 (daily ed. Nov. 4, l19) (statement of Sen. Shelby);
145 CONG. REc. S13786 (daily ed. Nov. 3,1999) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
21. See 145 CONG. REC. H11538 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 19)1 (statement of Rep.
Davis); 145 CONG. REc. S13S94 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (statement of Sen. Shelby);
145 CONG. REc. S13786 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1999) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
22 See 145 CONG. REC. H11538 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1(09) (statement of Rep.
Davis).
23. Lucas Mearian, Privacy Act Costly in Finance Sector; Firms Spend Ahih. 1ns to
Recast Databases, COMPUTERWORLD, July 9, 2001, at 1 (citing Christine Pratt,
TowerGroup analyst).
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to be required to use opt-in provisions rather than opt-outs.24 She
also draws attention to the high costs that are presently caused by
fraud and consumer confusion.'
Supporters of an opt-out provision felt the requirement
that companies notify consumers of their privacy policies2 6 gave
consumers plenty of freedom, as the consumers would be able
choose whether they wanted their personal information shared.27
In addition, they claimed that the industry would be unable to
offer consumers convenient and beneficial services.2" One bank
executive said that "if customers have to opt in to information-
sharing procedures that are necessary for certain business
practices, customers' natural 'inertia' about responding to privacy
notices would become a problem., 29  The American Bankers
Association (ABA) worried that opt-in requirements would raise
the costs of goods and services provided by financial institutions.3"
The ABA argued that this is because financial companies normally
use integrated systems in order to operate more efficiently.3'
"Requiring customers to opt-in to information sharing decreases
the speed, lowers the efficiency, and raises the cost of
information," according to one commentator.
32
24. Beth Givens, Financial Privacy: The Shortcomings of the Federal Financial
Services Modernization Act, Address Before the California Bar Association Annual
Meeting (Sept. 15, 2000), available at http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/fin-privacy.htm
(last visited Feb. 23, 2002).
25. Id.
26. 15 U.S.C. § 6803 (2000).
27. See 145 CONG. REC. S13786 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1999) (statement of Sen.
Gramm).
28. Givens, supra note 24.
29. Lavonne Kuykendall, Privacy Officers Say Role Keeps on Growing, AM.
BANKER, Aug. 28, 2001, at 1 (citing to Julie Johnson, chief privacy officer at Bank
One Corp.).
30. Ayca Ergeneman, The Devastating Effect of Opt-In Restrictions, at
http://www.aba.comllndustry+Issues/GRPROpt-in.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2002).
31. Id.
32. Id. The author raises the example of mortgage companies. Id.
With opt-in, a financial institution would be forced to begin from
scratch the process of collecting and verifying information about a
customer who has applied for a mortgage. This process would take
much longer than it does today, create delays in mortgage closings,
and raise the interest rate on mortgage loans.
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The affiliate-sharing controversy arose because allowing
different types of financial institutions to affiliate with each other
in a financial holding company was originally the primary focus of
GLBA 3 There was a concern, however, that the companies
would share nonpublic information they gathered with affiliated
companies if GLBA did not give consumers an opportunity to opt
out.M
Supporters of information-sharing among affiliates pointed
out that sharing customer information benefits the customer by
providing synergies of sales and marketing." This broad choice of
services creates the convenience of "one-stop shopping."'
However, critics of the idea balked at allowing holding companies
to "share a wealth of nonpublic personal financial information
with affiliated telemarketers selling nonfinancial products such as
travel services, dental plans, and so forth.' ' 7  Senator Richard
Shelby (R-AL) expressed concern that "large financial
conglomerates will have more information on citizens than the
IRS, but [Congress has] done virtually nothing to protect the
sharing of such nonpublic personal financial information for the
American people."' '
Ultimately, the final act provided for an opt-out provision,
rather than an opt-in provision.' The act carved out several
exceptions to the opt-out notice requirement placed upon the
33. See 145 CONG. REC. S13908 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 199j (statement of Sen.
Lieberman).
34. Givens, supra note 24.
35. Jack Cooksey, Private Matters: Does the Las. Go Far Enotuqh to Protect
Privacy?, at http:.1Avwwv,.inidebiz.conhamptnroadsfspccial-reportspcial,2 UJi.
htm (last visited Feb. 23, 2002). Vic Albrecht, director of compliance for First
Union's capital management group says, -[w]hcn ou do business vith First Union,
you expect to be able to do business with all of First Union." Id.
36. See id, 145 CONG. REC. S13S95 (daily Ld. Nov. 4, 1q99) (statement of Sen.
Shelby).
37. 145 CONG. REc. S13894 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (statement of Sen. Shelby)
(emphasis added); see infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text (a bill propou d by
Senator Sarbanes would amend GLBA).
38. 145 CONG. REc. S13S94 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (statement of Sen. Shelby).
One fear that has been mentioned is that this mass of information being collected on
individuals may enable the legal system to one day routinely subptz.na the
information in civil and criminal cases. Givens, supra note 24. This concern vas
raised in response to the subpoenaing of Monica Leinski's book purchases from a
bookstore. Id.
39. 15 U.S.C. § 6S02(b) (2000).
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companies.4" An opt-out notice was not required when the
nonpublic information was provided to "perform services for or
functions on behalf of the financial institution, including marketing
of the financial institution's own products or services, or financial
products or services offered pursuant to joint agreements between
two or more financial institutions that comply with [certain]
requirements .... "'" The finalized act also allowed companies to
share nonpublic information with affiliated companies, 2 causing
Senator Shelby to refer to GLBA privacy provisions as "a sham."43
Another important aspect of the bill required banks to develop a
privacy policy and send it to their customers, annually detailing the
types and amount of information the bank shares and how to opt
out of such sharing.'
One more crucial component to GLBA is an expressed
acknowledgement that states are allowed to provide more
stringent privacy requirements than the federal bill requires.45
Taking advantage of this provision, the California legislature
almost became the first state to mandate a general opt-in
requirement.46 The proposed California law would have required
financial institutions to get customer permission before sharing the
customer information with nonaffiliated parties, and it would have
required them to give customers the opportunity to opt out of
most sharing with affiliated parties.47 The bill was eventually
defeated; 4" however, some commentators feel certain that other
40. See 15 U.S.C. § 6802(b)(2).
41. Id. To be covered by these exceptions, the financial institution must also
disclose the fact that they are providing this information, as well as ensure
contractually that the non-affiliate will maintain the confidentiality of the
information. Id.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 6802(a).
43. 145 CONG. REc. S13894 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (statement of Sen. Shelby).
44. 15 U.S.C. § 6803(a) (2000).
45. 15 U.S.C. § 6807(b).
46. Oscar Marquis, Tout the Benefits of Information Sharing Before State
Legislatures Take It Away, AM. BANKER, Aug. 31, 2001, at 7.
47. Financial Information Privacy Act of 2002,2001 Cal. Legis. Serv. 773 (West).
48. STAR SYSTEMS, FINANCIAL PRIVACY: BEYOND TITLE V OF GRAMM-LEACH-
BLILEY 24 (Nov. 2001) [hereinafter STAR SYSTEMS], available at http://www.star-
systems.com/privacy.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2002).
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states would follow California's lead should it ever pass similar
legislation.49
There may be more change to GLBA itself on the
horizon5 Senator Paul Sarbanes (D-MD) has proposed new
legislation that would further restrict the activity of financial
institutions.51 The name for this relatively new bill is the Financial
Information Privacy Protection Act of 2001.'2 This act would be
similar to the proposed California legislation, providing for an
"opt-out" when sharing with affiliates, but requiring the "opt-in"
only for "some types of sensitive financial or medical
information., 53 This act would also give customers the right to see
information being released and give them an opportunity to
correct any mistakes.' Other bills currently pending in Congress
that would amend GLBA are the Freedom from Behavioral
Profiling Act of 2000," the Privacy Act of 2001.6' and the
49. Marquis, supra note 46, at 7. For a general summary of opt-in legislation
recently passed by Vermont, see WILMER, CUTLER & PICKERING, SELECTED RECENT
DEVELOPMENTS REGARDING CONSUMER FINANCIAL PRIVACY: VERMIONT
REGULATIONS AND FEDERAL AGENCY FAQs, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS GROUP
NEWSLETER, Jan. 10, 2002, http:llv,,'T.vilmer.comdoLsinev;s items!ACFE71.pdf
(last visited Feb. 23,2002).
50. See infra notes 51 - 59 and accompanying text.
51. Financial Information Privacy Protection Act of 2001, S. 30, 107th Cong.
(2001), available at http://thomas.loc.govfbsszdl07query.html (last visited Feb. 23.
2002).
52. Id. The bill is sponsored by seven other senators and has the support of
several interest groups. Press Release, Maryland Senator Paul Sarbanes, Sarbanes
Spearheads Financial Privacy Legislation as Priority in New Congress (Jan. 23.2001)
[hereinafter Press Release, Sarbanes], http:Ufsarbanes.senate.govipages!press
sarbanes_spearheads financial 1.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2002).
53. Financial Information Privacy Protection Act of 2001, S. 30. 107th Cong. § 3
(2001).
54. Financial Information Privacy Protection Act of 2001, S. 30, 107th Cong.
§ 511 (2001). The companies would be allowed to charge for access to the
information. Id. at § 511(d).
55. Freedom from Behavioral Profiling Act of 2000, S. 536, 107th Cong. § 2
(2001). The bill would prohibit a financial institution from sharing marketing and
behavioral profiling information for the purpose of marketing nonfinancial products
vdthout the customer's affirmative consent (opt-in). Id.
56. Privacy Act of 2001, S. 1055, 107th Cong. §101 (2001). This bill would extend
the GLBA requirement of opt-out disclosures to commercial entities, as v, elI as
prohibit companies from selling, purchasing, or displaying to the general public
someone's personal identifiable information. Id.
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Consumer's Right to Financial Privacy Act.57 After the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, these non-terrorism related issues
were briefly put on hold,58 although they were quickly put back on
the table by October 16."
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF GLBA's PRIVACY PROVISIONS
When the bill was finally passed in 1999, financial
institutions took several actions, which included expanding the
role of their privacy officers,6 ° finding ways to manage the high
cost GLBA implementation brought with it,6' dealing with
complicated management issues,6  and developing privacy
policies.63 One of the earliest actions companies took in response
to GLBA was to expand the role of the privacy officer.' The role
of chief privacy officer has become more of a strategic business
position than in years past. One chief privacy officer mentioned
that she meets with senior executives "at least quarterly to talk
57. Consumer's Right to Financial Privacy Act, H.R. 2720, 107th Cong. § 502
(2001). The bill would mandate an opt-in requirement for banks to share
information with affiliates or non-affiliates. Id.
58. Michele Heller, GOP Privacy Hawk Shifts Focus to War On Terrorists, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 28, 2001, at 1. In public comments he made, Senator Shelby, one of
the toughest privacy advocates, said, "[wie've got to be a hell of a lot more
aggressive," in response to the September 11, 2001, attacks. Id. Fellow privacy
advocates were wondering how he could protect consumers from misappropriation of
their nonpublic information while at the same time push for the government to have
more access to such information in the aid of national security. See id. Sen. Shelby
moved his proposals to the "back burner" because, he said, "[c]ircumstances
change." Id.
59. Michele Heller, Capitol Hill Gets Back to Pre-Terror Issues, AM. BANKER,
Oct. 16, 2001, at 1. Rep. Tauzin (R-LA.) said, "today we're more interested in
security than privacy. But we thought it was appropriate today to stand before you
and say: This issue is still here, and it's a critical one." Id.
60. See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
62 See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
64. See Kuykendall, supra note 29, at 1.
65. Id. The expanded role of privacy officers has also been an effect of internet
banking and the increased ease of sharing information electronically. Lisa
Fickenscher, Big Banks Put Senior-Level Execs on Privacy Watch, AM. BANKER, Jul.
12, 1999, at 1. A proposed amendment to the law would require financial institutions
to appoint someone to be responsible for ensuring compliance with Title V of
GLBA. S. 451,107th Cong. § 4 (2001).
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about strategies." In addition to privacy officers, companies are
also forming privacy committees composed of individuals from
various departments. 67 This allows the privacy officers to keep
abreast of their companies' privacy practices!"
This change was relatively easy, however, when compared
to the overall gigantic cost of implementing Title V.'  The
American Bankers Association (ABA) initially estimated that the
costs would run as high as $1.25 billion.'4 A July 9, 2001,
Computerworld article suggested that companies had already
"spent more than $400 million compiling privacy policies and
identifying partners and third parties with whom they share
data.",71 A November 2001 survey found that the high costs most
seriously affected smaller financial institutions."2 Consolidating
several databases containing the same consumer information into
one database that can only be accessed by the proper companies
has carried with it one of the larger price tags.73  If opt-in
requirements are ever mandated, the costs v;ill likely run even
higher.74 One industry analyst says that such requirements would
run the cost "to Y2k spending proportions.""
Management difficulties have arisen, as well, in trying to
devise a way to configure company databases so that affiliates do
not have access to other affiliates' information.7 ' Concerns also
66. Kuykendall, supra note 29, at 1 (quoting Robin Warren, top privacy executive
at Bank of America Corp. in Charlotte, N.C.).
67. Id.
63. Id.
69. See Michele Heller, Banks Want More Time on Reform s Privacy Rtdc, AM 1.
BAN ,R, Apr. 12,2000, at 3.
70. Id.
71. Mearian, supra note 23, at 1.
72. AMERICA'S CO=mUNrY BANKERS, ACB PRIVACY COMPLIANCE SURVEY
(November 2001), at http:'lv,%,.T,:.acbankers.orgIlettersfcompliance..survey.htm. The
America's Community Bankers survey found that "tals a percentage of non-interest
expenses, the smallest group... of institutions paid almost four times as much as the
largest group in the survey .... " Id.
73. See Mearian, supra note 23. at 1.
74. Id. (citing Christine Pratt, TowerGroup analyst).
75. 1d. (citing Christine Pratt, TowerGroup analyst).
76. See Kuykendall, supra note 29, at 1 (quoting Robin Warren, top privacy
executive at Bank of America Corp. in Charlotte, N.C.). This would only apply to
companies that, in light of the fact that they must now disclose their privacy policy,
opt not to share information with affiliates. See 15 U.S.C. § 0392(a) 120W)} (stating
that financial institutions are allowed to share information with affiliates).
20021 62 5
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
exist regarding variations between different state laws, which make
the operation of national financial institutions difficult to
coordinate between states. 7
Drafting privacy policies and communicating these policies
to consumers have presented challenges for financial institutions. 8
A November 2001 "survey found that the great majority of
institutions with less than $1 billion in assets do not share customer
information with non-affiliated third parties beyond the basic
exceptions provided under GLBA. '' 79 The same survey also found
that "[a]pproximately one of every two institutions with assets
greater than $1 billion shares information with non-affiliated third
parties . . . to offer products and services they believe their
customers would find of value." 8 Of the top ten North Carolina
banks, only Fidelity Bank and First Union share information with
non-affiliates beyond the exceptions stated in GLBA.8 l Bank of
America, Branch Banking and Trust Company, Central Carolina
Bank and Trust Company, RBC Centura, First Bancorp, First
Charter Bank, First Citizens Bank & Trust Company, and
Wachovia do not share information with non-affiliates beyond
these exceptions. An American Banker article suggests that only
77. Kuykendall, supra note 29, at 1; see also supra notes 45-49 and accompanying
text (discussing California's proposed legislation).
78. Eileen Colkin, The 1999 Privacy Act Means Banks Must Make an Ongoing
Effort to Communicate with Customers, INFORMATIONWEEK, Aug. 20, 2001, at 52.
79. AMERICA'S COMMUNITY BANKERS, supra note 72.
80. Id.
81. See The Fidelity Bank Privacy Principles, at http://www.fidelitybank.
com/security-policy.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2002); First Union Privacy Statement,
at http://personalfinance.firstunion.com/pflcda/cs/privacy/O,,,00.html (last visited Feb.
23, 2002). See supra note 41 and accompanying text (discussing the GLBA
exceptions to the opt-out requirement).
82. See Bank of America Privacy Policy for Consumers, at
http://www.bankofamerica.com/privacy/index.cfm?template=privacysecur..cnsmr.cfm
(last visited Feb. 23, 2002); BB&T Consumer Privacy Notice, at
http://www.bbandt.com/privacy/privacynotice.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2002); CCB
Privacy Policy, at http://www.ccbonline.com/homepage/general/privacyPolicy.htm
(last visited Feb. 23, 2002); Centura Bank Privacy Policy, at
http://www.centura.comlaboutoverviewprivacy-policy_0701.cfm (last visited Feb. 5,
2002); First Bancorp Privacy Policy, at http://216.167.73.157/links/linksl/jump.
cgi?ID=1729 (last visited Feb. 23, 2002); First Charter Privacy Policy Notice, at
http://www.firstcharter.com/global/privacy.asp (last visited Feb. 23, 2002); First
Citizens Bank Privacy Policy, at http://www.firstcitizens.cornaupp.shtml (last visited
Feb. 23, 2002); Wachovia Privacy Policy, at http://www.wachovia.com/privacy/
privacy.asp (last visited Feb. 23, 2002).
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a few financial institutions give customers the opportunity to opt
out of allowing the institution to share personal information within
their own family of affiliates, as they are entitled to do by law."
However, another look at the top ten North Carolina banks
reveals that only Central Carolina Bank & Trust Company, the
Fidelity Bank, First Bancorp, and First Citizens Bank do not
provide their customers a mechanism in their privacy policies for
opting out of having their information shared with affiliates.
IV. CONSUMER REACTION
While financial institutions had numerous concerns,
consumers seemed to react by ignoring the law? This reaction is
somewhat surprising, considering the number of polls and surveys
that have indicated growing consumer concern over the
confidentiality of personal information.-6 A 1998 American
Association of Retired Persons (AARP) survey showed that
eighty-one percent of the participants were opposed to affiliated
companies sharing personal information." A Louis Harris survey
of the same year found that ninety percent of people worry about
threats to their privacy." Young Boozer, executive vice president
of Colonial Bank in Montgomery, Alabama, says, "[p]eople want
to be sure their information is protected and not used
inappropriately."' 9 Consumers seemed to affirm this theory by
fiercely protesting the merger of Doubleclick and Abacus when it
83. Lavonne Kuykendall, Managing Privacy: Ticked Off in '09, a Customer
Remains Angry, AM. BANKER, Aug. 21, 2001, at 1. See 15 U.S.C. § (S02(a) (200))
(stating that financial institutions were not required to send opt-out notices %,hen
sharing information vith their own affiliates).
84. See CCB Privacy Policy, supra note 82: The Fidelity Bank Privacy Principles,
supra note 81; First Bancorp Privacy Policy, supra note 82; First Citizens Bank
Privacy Policy, supra note 82. For the companies that do allow their customers to opt
out, usually all that is required is a telephone call. See Bank of America Privacy
Policy for Consumers, supra note 82; BB&T Consumer Privacy Notice, supra note 82;
Centura Bank Privacy Policy, supra note 82: First Charter Privacy Policy Notice,
supra note 82; Wachovia Privacy Policy, supra note 82.




89. Wirtz, supra note 3.
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was revealed that the two companies would merge their
databases."
Given this information, one could easily conclude that
consumers would gladly send in their bank's forms expressing a
desire to opt out of the dissemination of their personal information
to third parties.9" However, early surveys estimated that only
about five percent of consumers have actually opted out of their
company's sharing policy.92 A more recent survey had a much
higher count, finding that thirty-one percent of those surveyed
had opted out.93 This survey, however, admitted that there could
be over reporting due to the possibility of consumers
misunderstanding what it means to "opt out."94 Another survey
found that only about a third of consumers had even read the
privacy notices they had received.95
V. EXPLANATIONS FOR LACK OF CONSUMER REACTION
No shortage of explanations exists for why the response
from consumers has been so minimal.96 Explanations include the
unreadability of the notices,' the length of the notices,98 the intent
on the part of the drafters for a low response,99 the use of the
notices as a marketing ploy,"° the lack of an informed public,' a
general consumer apathy,0 2 and, in spite of conventional wisdom
to the contrary, 03 a possible disinterest on the part of the
90. Givens, supra note 24. Doubleclick is a website that gathers anonymous
information on "the web-surfing patterns of millions of Internet users," and Abacus
is "a company that compiles personally identifiable information about the mail order
catalog purchases of 90 million households." Id.
91. See Woodruff, supra note 1.
92- Id.
93. STAR SYSTEMS, supra note 48, at 43.
94. Id. at 40.
95. Woodruff, supra note 1.
96. See infra notes 97-164 and accompanying text.
97. See infra notes 106-18 and accompanying text.
9& See infra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
99. See infra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
100. See infra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
101. See infra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
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consumer in financial privacy,' " and even a possible desire for the
sharing of their information.1"5
The unreadability of the notices is one of the simplest and
most often cited explanations)' Although the law requires the
notices to be "clear and conspicuous,""'7 one analyst noted that
American Express' privacy notice was written on a graduate
school reading level.' Literacy experts usually recommend that
materials sent out to the general public be written on a junior high
school level.' This level is recommended because only about
twenty-five percent of Americans have a college degree, and most
people typically read three to five grades lower than their highest
educational level.l"' One study of sixty privacy notices concluded
that the notices averaged a third- to fourth-year college grade
level, which marks them as "difficult" to read on the Flesch
Reading Ease Score."' Most scores also fall below the standard
several states require for insurance policies that are sold within
their states."' An October 2001 report by USAction"' caused
quite a stir in the financial community when it reported that, of the
fifteen privacy notices it surveyed, most received either a "D" or
104. See infra notes 145-56 and accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 157-64 and accompanying text.
106. Woodruff, supra note 1.
107. 15 U.S.C. § 6S03(a) (2000).
108. Woodruff, supra note 1.
109. Mark Hochhauser, Lost in the Fine Print: Readability of Financial Privacy
Notices, at http:Ilhw,,w.privacrights.orglar/GLB-Reading.htm (last %isited Feb. 23,
2002).
110. Id
111. Id. The Flesch Reading Ease Score takes into account the average number of
syllables per word and the average number of words per sentence to compute a score
from one to one hundred. A high number indicates a readable text. MEDIC IX
SCHOOL INSTITUTIONAL REVI~EW BOARD, COMiPUTER SOFT-WXRE TO ESTI-MATE
READABILITY OF TEXT, at http:lvAw,.med.umich.edtirbme~dinformational
Documentslconsent/software.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2002).
112- See Hochhauser, supra note 109. Only ten of the notices would have met the
minimum score in Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, and Ohio. Id. Only three ould
have met the standard in Connecticut and Florida, and none of the notices %, ould
have met the standard in Maine. Id.
113. BRYAN O'MALLEY, E. JOYCE GOULD & CITIZEN AcrIoN or NEW YORx,
YOUR PRIVACY IS IMPORTANT TO Us? A REPORT CARD oN, How BxNK PRIV ACY
NOTICES DISCOURAGE CONSUMERS FROM EXERCISING THE RIwHi It FrI VtIAL
PRIVACY (executive summary Oct. 2001) [hereinafter CiTIzEN' AvTioN], at
http:/vv,,wv.citizenactionny.orglexecsum-bankpriv acNOl.pdf (last %isited Feb. 23.
2002).
2002] 629
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
an "F." 114 Citigroup and Bank One Corp./First USA received the
highest grades for having a clear and understandable privacy
notice, and MBNA America received the lowest grade." 5 The
banks surveyed questioned the methodology USAction used, as
well as noting that their notices were developed using considerable
consumer input.' 6  The banks also point to low customer
complaints." 7 Indeed, an August 2001 survey found that of those
consumers who read their privacy policies, eighty-four percent said
they had understood them.' l
In addition to the unreadability, the notices may have been
so long and involved that consumers just did not want to bother
reading them."9 Indeed, Wells Fargo sent consumers a ten-page
privacy notice. 12' The study mentioned above noted that although
many surveys used bullet points, those points were often followed
by two paragraphs of text.' 2' In addition, only about seventeen
percent of the sentences in each notice were identified as "short"
by Grammatik 6.0 software. 22 Joe Belew, Consumers Bankers
Association (CBA) President, blames the poorly worded notices
on the "complicated and tortured regulations ... that even confuse
114. See Rob Blackwell, Ahead of Privacy Talks, Last-Minute Posturing, AM.
BANKER, Dec. 4, 2001, at 1. The fifteen banks surveyed were First Union Corp.;
Columbus Bank & Trust; HSBC; First Premiere Bank; FleetBoston Financial Corp.;
First Consumers National Bank; People's Bank; Metris Companies, Inc.; Citigroup;
U.S. Bancorp; Bank of America, Chase Manhattan Corp., Bank One Corp./First
USA Bank; Provident Bancorp Inc.; and MBNA America. Citizen Action of New
York, supra note 113, at v. Of these fifteen, only First Consumers National, People's,
Citigroup, Bank of America, Bank One/First USA, and Provident Bancorp received
a C. Id. All others received a "D" or an "F." Id.
115. CITIZEN ACTION, supra note 113, at ii. Citigroup and Bank One/First USA
received 2.3 out of a possible 4.0 points, and MBNA received 0.3 out of a possible 4.0
points. Id. at ii.
116. See Blackwell, supra note 114, at 1.
117. Id.
118. In Brief. SIA Survey Finds Privacy Notices Work, AM. BANKER, Aug. 14,
2001, at 5 [hereinafter In Brief]. This survey was funded by the Securities Industry
Association. Id. The survey also found that only sixty percent of the respondents
had recalled receiving a notice, and, of those, only sixty-seven percent had bothered
to read it. Id.
119. See Woodruff, supra note 1.
120. Id.




lawmyers.... , "' In late 2001, the Federal Trade Commission and
seven other regulatory agencies sponsored a workshop to help
financial institutions write better privacy notices.2
The notices, however, may have deliberately been long and
confusing." Critics charge that one reason the companies made
their notices so long and confusing was because they want a low
response rate, which the companies hope will lead legislators to
believe consumers are simply not interested in their financial
privacy.'26 The fear of these critics may be justified, because the
CBA President, Joe Belew, has expressed his view that the low
response rate is an indication that consumer reaction "has been
pretty positive," thus indicating his belief that consumers are
satisfied with their banks sharing consumer information with other
companies.127 While one anonymous banker agrees, stating that
consumers must "see this as a good business opportunity, a chance
to make a business choice about how they want their information
used,"'2 Wes Vernon of Newsmax.com points out that this view
"assumes that malng the customer go to the trouble of informing
the bank to remove his or her name from the list constitutes a real
'choice' in the strictest sense of the term."' 
2
Another reason the language may have been confusing to
some customers is because many financial institutions decided to
123. Wes Vernon, Banks Use Sneaky. Methods to Sell Your Financial Data, Social
Security Number, at http:Il/wTw,.deweeseonline.comiarticle_'neakymethod.html (on
file vith the North Carolina Banking Institute). This view vas echoed by a number
of banking executives at a December 2001 workshop. Nicole Duran, Bankers Stand
By Work on Privacy Notices, AM. BANKER, Dec. 5, 2001, at 1. "We had to figure out
how to fit our Cinderella foot into the unforgiving Gramm-Leach-Bliley glass
slipper." Id. (quoting Robin K. Warren, Privacy Executive for Bank of America
Corp.).
124. Get Noticed" Effective Financial Privacy Notices, at http:llww.ft.got/b~p
workshopslglblindex.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2 112). The seven other agencies are
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System- the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission; the Department of Treasury, Office of the Comptroller of
Currency; the Department of Treasury. Office of Thrift Supervision the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation; the National Credit Union Administration; and the
Securities and Exchange Commission. Id.
125. See, eg., Friery & Givens, supra note 5; Vernon, supra note 123.
126. See Vernon, supra note 123.
127. hL
128. Id. (quoting an anonymous banker).
129. Ld.
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use the privacy notices as a marketing ploy. 3° These financial
institutions phrased their privacy notices in such a way as to lead
the customer to believe the companies had structured their policies
to benefit the consumer.1 3 1 The notices would begin with phrases
such as: "Because you are a valued customer..." or "[i]n order to
provide you with better products and services...."'32 Tena Friery
and Beth Givens of the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse note that
"[ijead-ins of this sort do nothing to help consumers understand
the minimal privacy rights they have. Such declarations of
goodwill may even discourage consumers from reading further
into the notice where the gist of the company's policy is hidden."'33
The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) has
recently voiced its displeasure with the manner in which
companies are complying with the privacy provisions of GLBA
34
The OCC was particularly upset with the unreadability of the
notices and the fact that many banks have actually discouraged
customers from exercising their right to opt out.'35 Due to these
problems, Julie L. Williams, OCC Chief Counsel, has indicated
that the OCC may soon order some financial institutions to send
out corrective disclosures. 36
Lack of consumer knowledge may also have contributed to
such a small response rate. 137  In research for its "Managing
Privacy" series, American Banker found that many people had not
"looked twice" at their privacy notices and were not even sure
what they were. 3 According to one Phoenix attorney, the
consumers are "sick of them .... They think it's junk mail and it
goes straight to the circular file."'39 This is despite (or perhaps
130. See Friery & Givens, supra note 5; Woodruff, supra note 1.
131. See Woodruff, supra note 1.
132. Friery & Givens, supra note 5.
133. Id.
134. See R. Christian Bruce, Privacy: Banks Need Better Privacy Disclosures, OCC
Official Warns, Citing Agency Review, BNA BANKING DAILY, Oct. 17,2001.
135. Id. Some banks tell their customers not to opt out unless they are unhappy
with their bank's service, and other banks discourage the customers from reading the
entire notice. Id.
136. Id.
137. See W.A. Lee, Managing Privacy: A Consumer Perspective on Financial
Privacy, AM. BANKER, Sept. 4,2001, at 1.
138. Id.




because of?) the fact that the average household has received at
least fifteen privacy notices.140
Many of those who did bother to read their privacy notices
may have been surprised to learn that their financial institution is
even allowed to sell their personal information.4 ' One
commentator has observed that consumers seem to feel that there
is not much they can do to protect their privacy.' 42 This thinking
may lead to a general apathy in which, according to one study,
even consumers who have never been victimized by fraud expect
to be victimized eventually!" While consumers may be skeptical
of the financial industry as a whole, a survey conducted by the
Securities Industry Association found that seventy-four percent of
the respondents who had read their financial institution's privacy
notice were satisfied with their company's policy.'
Finally, poor consumer response may simply be due to the
fact that consumers are not as concerned about financial privacy as
surveys suggest. 45 A June 2001 study found that many survey
questions "distort or manipulate" the answers."' The study went
on to note that surveys "cannot effectively replicate the choices
that consumers make in the real world, where they must choose
among competing desires and where nothing comes for free."'" 7
The authors of the survey also point out that consumers are
continuing to shop online in record numbers despite early
forecasts that privacy concerns would keep them away."' The
study notes that other surveys show that when people are asked to
name their top concerns without being given a list of possible
responses, privacy is not listed as one of their top concerns." The
authors of the study also indicate that consumers may not alvays
140. See generally Marl: K. Anderson, Ignore This Letter Please, at httpj1Vw1,,w.
wired.comnewsbusinessO,1367,44893,00.html (June 29, 2001).
141. Kuykendall, supra note 29. at 1.
142. Lee, supra note 137, at 1.
143. See id.
144. In Brief, supra note 118, at 5.
145. See HARPER, supra note 1, at introductory page.
146. I& at 1. The study noted that the questions would group together scveral
widely-ranging concepts (such as "security, identity fraud, spare, and other crimes
and inconveniences") all under the blanket term "privacy." Id.
147. Id.
148. Id at introductory page.
149. Id. at 5. Issues such as medical care, education, crime, and Social Security are
the frequently-cited concerns. Id. at 5.
2002]
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE
report their actual behavior accurately. 5 °  For example, a
BusinessWeek/Harris survey found that thirty-five percent of
those surveyed "always" read privacy policies. 5 ' However,
website operators state that visitors pay very little attention to
their online privacy policies. 5 Additionally, a survey conducted
by the Securities Industry Association found that seventy-four
percent of those people who read their privacy notices were
actually satisfied with their bank's policy.'53
Lack of consumer concern appears to be even more
prevalent in the United States than in other countries.'54 An
October 1999 IBM survey states that sixty-four percent of their
United States respondents at least somewhat agree that "[miost
businesses handle the personal information they collect about
customers in a proper and confidential way.' '155 This percentage
compares to only fifty-eight percent in the United Kingdom and
fifty-four percent in Germany.'56
This lack of concern leads into the final explanation for
lack of consumer response: consumers may view the use of their
personal information as beneficial.'57 Two different surveys
indicate this to be the case.'58 The November 2001 STAR survey
found three broad ways in which a majority of those polled
thought the ability to share information would be helpful to them:
security, convenience, and marketing-related benefits.'59 Sixty-six
percent thought the ability to share information would help
"prevent fraud," and sixty percent thought it would "prevent or
minimize identity theft."'' Convenience was also seen as very
important, with sixty percent citing "improved customer service"
as a benefit and fifty-eight percent stating that the "ability to use
150. Id. at 7.
151. HARPER, supra note 1, at 7.
152. Id. The authors refer to this lack of congruence between words and action as
the "talk is cheap" problem with surveys. Id. at 6.
153. In Brief, supra note 118, at 5.
154. See IBM MULTI-NATIONAL CONSUMER PRIVACY SURVEY 13 (October 1999)
[hereinafter IBM], available at http://www-l.ibm.com/services/files/privacy-survey-
oct991.pdf (last visited Feb. 23, 2002).
155. Id. at 22.
156. Id.
157. See STAR SYSTEMS, supra note 48, at 15.
158. See IBM, supra note 154, at 11-12; STAR SYSTEMS, supra note 48, at 15.
159. See STAR SYSTEMS, supra note 48, at 15.
160. Id. at 54.
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another financial institution's ATM" was a benefit.'"' Fifty-four
percent thought "discounts on future purchases" would also be
beneficial, and fifty-three percent thought that the ability to
"receive information about new product offerings that interest
[them]" would be a benefit.16 2 This interest in marketing was also
cited in the IBM Multi-National Privacy Survey.' Sixty percent
of the Americans polled in that survey viewed "personalized
marketing" as a "good thing.'1
64
VI. CONCLUSION
The scope of financial privacy has dramatically changed in
the last few years, and GLBA has contributed substantially to that
change.1 65 However, much data is still being collected on how the
consumer feels about financial privacy,"" and little response by
consumers to the opt-out notices is unlikely to help clear up the
matter of how to regulate privacy."6 7 Therefore, federally
mandated "opt-out" requirements are unlikely to be the final word
on the subject."'S While unreadable notices,"' long notices,' 7°
deliberately poor drafting,' use of the notices as marketing
ploys, "'72 lack of consumer knowledge regarding GLBA,'73
consumer apathy, 74 lack of concern, 7" and a possible belief in the
benefits of information-sharing'76 have all been offered as possible
explanations for the lack of a strong consumer response to their
161. Id. at 54.
162. Id.
163. See IBM, supra note 154, at 20.
164. Id.
165. See 145 CONG. REC. E2_302 (daily ed. Nov. 8, 1999) (speech of Hon. Carolyn
C. Kilpatrick).
166. Compare Givens, supra note 24, with IBM, supra note 154, at 11-12.
167. See supra notes 85-95 and accompanying text.
168. See Leland Chan & James Clark, Financial Information Privacy Act Would
Breed Copycat Problems, AM. BANKER, Oct. 5. 20131, at 9.
169. See supra notes 106-18 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 145-56 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 157-64 and accompanying text.
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opt-out rights, both federal and state legislators are likely to
continue drafting new legislation until they reach a conclusion that
the legislators feel gives individuals the say they deserve in
determining what happens to their private information. 7'
ERIC POGGEMILLER
177. See, e.g., Press Release, Sarbanes, supra note 52.
[Vol. 6
